China's agricultural trade expanded rapidly following economic reforms and the open-door policy adopted in the late 1970s. The composition of agricultural trade with China follows its labor-abundant and land-scarce resource endowment with imports of bulk and processed intermediates and exports of consumer-ready and processed goods. Constraints on U. S.-China agricultural trade include tariffs, state trading, food security policies, and other nontariff barriers. Growth potential is based on China's fundamental demand forces including the world's largest population, a high real-income growth rate, an emerging urban middle class, and further trade reforms to be implemented through accession to the World Trade Organization.
Organization.
Over the past several years, the People's Republic of China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world. Its real per capita GDP has grown at 9.78'-ZOper annum from 1987 to 1996. Many people in China are becoming prosperous, especially in the regions along the coast where investment and employment growth are fueling the rise of a middle class with discretionary spending habits that favor consumption of value-enhanced food and agricultural products. The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the structure, constraints, and potential for U.S.-China agricultural trade. Particular attention will be given to the potential of value-enhanced food product trade.
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China's Total and Agricultural Trade
Since the initiation of the economic reforms and "open-door" policies in the late 1970s, China's total and agricultural trade have experienced rapid expansion. China has become one of the world's largest traders. Statistics showing China's total and agricultural trade for the 1980-95 period are presented in table 1. Total exports and imports in 1995 reached $148.7 and $132.1 billion, respectively. Since 1980, the value of exports has increased by 7.2 times and imports by 6.6 times. China's shares of total world exports increased from 0.9% in 1980 to 3% in 1995, while its import share increased from 0.970 in 1980 to 2.64% in 1995. The rise of China's status in international trade has accelerated over the last several years. Annual growth rates from 199 l-95 for total exports and imports were 19% and 20%, respectively, compared to rates of only 13% and 10% from 1980-90.
Agricultural trade also has increased sig- nificantly. Agricultural export value reached $14.4 billion in 1995, and imports were $18.3 billion (table 1) . These levels are 3,2 times and 2.3 times higher, respectively, than the values for 1980. However, the growth rates for agricultural trade, 8% for exports and 5.7% for imports, are much slower than for total trade. As a result, the share of agricultural trade in total China trade has declined from 25.1 % in 1980 to 9.7% in 1995 for agricultural exports, and from 39.99Z0to 13.8% for agricultural imports.
Composition of China's Agricultural Trade by Degree of Processing
The structure of China's agricultural trade in 1995 and 1996 is presented in table 2 in terms of the degree of processing, readiness to eat, and implicitly by factor intensity. Based on work by Wang (1997a), China's agricultural trade is separated into four major categories:
(a) bulk commodities, (b) processed intermediate goods, (c) horticultural products, and (d) consumer-ready goods.
Overall, China was a net agricultural importer in 1995 by $1.3 billion, but a net exporter in 1996 by nearly $0.9 billion (table 2) . However, the export and import positions for the four subcategories are more consistently and distinctly export or import oriented. Specifically, most (95 'ZO) of China's agricultural imports are either bulk or processed intermediates. Exports are more diversified, but are dominated by consumer-ready products and processed intermediates. Wang (1997a) argues that this composition is consistent with the factor endowment trade theory that asserts the relatively labor-abundant and land-scarce economy of China will export labor-intensive processed food products and will import bulk land-intensive grains and fibers. 
New Zealand (AUS/NZL);
the Latin-American newly industrialized countries of Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Mexico (LNIC); and Canada. The strength of the U.S. export position is in bulk and consumer-ready products, with a significant share increase in horticultural products in 1996. Australia/New Zealand, LNIC, and ASEAN7 were important sources for the supply of processed intermediate products, ASEAN7 had a dominant supply position for horticultural products in 1995, but this was eroded by large share increases for the U. S., Canada, and Australia/New Zealand. The primary competitors with the U.S. in supplying consumer-ready products were Japan, Hong Kong/Taiwan (identified in table 3 as two of the three CHN3 members), EU15 (the 15 European Union countries), and ASEAN7. From table 3, the leading markets for China's agricultural exports are Japan, CHN3 (Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan), EU15, and ASEAN7. The U.S. imports less than 5% of China's agricultural exports, without any particular bias in flows by degree of processing. Japan is the primary destination for bulk exports, processed intermediates, and consumerready products. Only for horticultural products are CHN3 and EU 15 more important markets than Japan for China's exports.
Commodi~Composition of China's Net Agricultural Trade
The volumes of net imports by China from 1985-97 for major agricultural commodities are presented in table 4. With the exception of 1992, cotton imports have exceeded exports since the late 1980s. Wheat consistently has been a major net import into China. While rice and coarse grains traditionally have been net exports, both shifted dramatically to a large net import situation in 1994 and 1995.
Livestock trade is significantly affected by Hong Kong's markets. Many products are reexported to China through Hong Kong, which is not reflected in China's import data reported by China's customs statistics (Wang 1997a China since 1990, and for greater China, net imports have increased six-fold since 1990. Based on aggregated data for bulk U.S. exports to China, the share for the U.S. of China's imports for 1994-96 averaged 28% for wheat, 35% for cotton, 49910 for coarse grains, and 54% for soybeans.
Agricultural inputs are another important set of products for U.S.-China trade. Table 5 provides estimates of the value of China's imports of agricultural machinery, fertilizers, and pesticides during 1980-95. By 1995, the total import value for these three inputs was $4.4 billion. The value of U.S. exports of fertilizers to China for 1995 was $1.2 billion, implying a 31 %'omarket share. Table 6 details China's share of U.S. agricultural exports. Although the shares are comparatively small, the total trade share is trending strongly upward. Cotton, oilseed and vegetable oils, and poultry best reflect the rising importance of China trade for the U.S. Once again, it is worth noting that Hong Kong is a large importer of U.S. livestock products. Recent estimates by the Agricultural Trade Of- lice, U.S. Department of Agriculture/Foreign Agricultural Service (USDA/FAS) in Shanghai suggest that a large proportion of the livestock products (largely chicken feet and wings) are re-exported to Mainland China (Ho and Reynolds) . Hong Kong dominated the supply into China's imported meat markets from 1980-95. On average during this period, Hong Kong supplied 569. of imported beef to China, 32% of imported pork, 85% of imported poultry, 7270 of offal, and 56% of processed meats (Le and Chen).
China's Share of U.S. Agricultural Exports
During the 1986-96 period, greater China's share for total U.S. grain exports fluctuated from 0.31% in 1986 to 6.88% in 1989 (table  6) . This volatility, in part caused by China's state trading system, reflects the instability that China has transmitted to U.S. and world grain markets. The major U.S. grain export to China is wheat. One of the most successful market developments for U.S. trade into China has been poultry meat. China and Hong Kong's share of U.S. poultry exports averaged 19.99. for the 1994-96 period. Similarly, the share of 
Importance of China's Agricultural Trade for Southern States
Poultry, cotton, soybeans, and wheat trade have direct importance for the southern states of the U.S. Therefore the growth experienced in these markets should be, and is, reflected in the significance of export shipments from the southern states. The data presented in table 7 clearly indicate the growth in agricultural shipments to China from the U.S. southern region from 1993 through 1995. The data also show that the southern states' export share has increased for all exports to China during this period.
Trade Constraints for U.S.-China Food and Agricultural Trade While the characterization of China as a growing market is reflected in the discussion and data presented above, there are a number of factors that constrain U.S. food and agricultural trade with China. Most importantly, significant import tariffs remain despite a series of tariff reductions. There are also considerable types of nontariff barriers (NTBs) that hamper U.S. trade as China remains outside of the World Trade Organization (WTO) discipline on NTBs. Food security policy in China is designed to limit dependence upon certain bulk grain imports. In addition to these trade policy constraints, China's factor endowment favors imports of bulk rather than value-added products, and investment and employment incentives in China support this development. Both resource endowment and policy incentives to develop labor-intensive, value-added manufacturing and processing are important constraints for substantial growth in U.S. value-added agricultural exports to China.
Tarifs and Market Access
Early in 1993, China reduced its tariffs on 3,371 import items and abolished import controls on more than 367 commodities (Wang 1997a) . The trade-weighted average tariff rate was reduced by 7.370 by this action (Zhang and Warr) . Again, in April 1996, China reduced tariffs on over 6,000 import items from an average of 35 % to 23%, still high compared to an average of 13-15% for developing countries. For agriculture, tariff-rate quotas were introduced for most grains and bulk commodities. However, even with these reforms, for selected processed and horticultural products, the tariff rate plus the value-added tax (VAT) rate assessed on the import value plus the tariff results in effective taxes on these imports of over 50%, as indicated in table 8.
In addition to tariffs, a number of nontariff trade barriers also restrict the potential for exports to China. Some of the more important obstacles include the Chinese government's sanitary protocols and inspection arrangements which are not transparent and have been criticized by many as being scientifically unjustifiable (Le and Chen). Agricultural and value-added products imported into China are also managed by quotas and licensing. All foreign enterprises importing animal products must be registered with the Chinese Administration of Animal and Plant Quarantine. This regulation also applies to foreign enterprises that produce, process, or store animal products in China. Until 1997, meat imports were allowed to be marketed only in the hotel, restaurant, and institutional sectors, One recent change adopted on January 1, 1997, was the establishment of a pilot program allowing beef, pork, and poultry to be imported from selected meat plants in the United States, Canada, and Australia for retail markets.
Food Self-Su~ciency and Competitive Advantage in Trade
Chinese policy makers continue to focus on the food security consequences of relying on world grain markets. From the mid-1950s to the early 1980s, China's grain production and allocation were strictly controlled by the cen- tral government. The government set the urban retail price below the purchase price from the farmer. Consumption subsidies on grain claimed as much as 20% of total national government revenues. To reduce the burden of the grain subsidies and to improve the economic efficiency of grain markets, in 1992, the government introduced market reforms and phased out the grain ration system. By the end of 1993, these market reforms accelerated; 28 out of 31 provinces had phased out the grain ration system (Crook 1997) .
Inflationary pressures in late 1993 and early 1994, and a decrease in the area sown to grains forced the government to reemphasize the importance of grain production in late 1994. The government of China initiated a new grain self-sufficiency policy with specific responsibility decentralized through provincial governors, known as mi dai zi shengzhangfizezhi, or the "grain-bag" responsibility system.
Under the "grain-bag" policy, the provincial governors were assigned responsibility to increase grain production and buy domestic grain to balance gaps between demand and supply. If governors still have deficits in their grain balance, then the central government is to arrange for grain imports. 
State Trading
Under the planning system prior to 1978, China's trade was conducted under a strict system of state trading, with only 10-16 foreign trade corporations completely responsible for all specified groups of products. Under the state trading system, indirect trade policy instruments were absent or unimportant, and there was a complete lack of transparency. Import volumes were determined by the projected difference between domestic demand and supply for particular goods. Commodity prices were set without regard to scarcity or cost, and were intended to serve only an accounting function (Martin and Bach) . Although reform of China's trade regime since 1978 has greatly reduced the operation of the state trading agencies and significantly increased the market mechanism, major agricultural trade nevertheless remains under the system of state trading (the Cereal, Oil, and Foodstuffs Importing and Exporting Corporation) or designated trading (table 9) . State trading allows the government to directly control imports, while designated trading arrangements do not allow such control, but probably create some local monopoly power-to the disadvantage of importers and exporters of these products (Martin and Bach) . Rice, corn, wheat, cotton, and tobacco are completely under the state trading system. Most of the nongrain crops (vegetable oils, sugar, tobacco, etc.) are in the state trading system, and are managed through designated trading, licenses, or quotas. According to Martin and Bach, coarse grains (except corn), meat, and milk in 1996 were not subject to restrictions by either state trading or designated trading. The strong reliance on state trading for major agricultural trade has raised concern about the transparency of China's agricultural trade regime (Dixit and Josling). The economic efficiency of China's grain trade system is viewed as low by some observers because there are numerous nontransparent market signals, resulting in distorted price levels and volatility (Carter, Chen, and Rozelle).
Potential for U.S.-China Agricultural and Food Trade
Several studies have suggested that future increases in the imports of agricultural products are inevitable if China's rapid economic growth and pursuit of economic reforms continue (Brown; Yang and Tyers; Anderson; Garnaut and Ma) . This view on import growth is supported by a number of empirical studies, including those by the International Food Policy Research Institute (Rosegrant, AgcaoiliSombilla, and Perez; Huang, Rozelle, and Rosegrant; Fan and Agcaoili-Sombilla 1997a), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (Huang) , the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF) of Japan, and the Food and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (Fuller and Rude) . While there is large variation among the projections (for a critical review, see Fan and Agcaoili-Sombilla 1997 b) , all of these studies project large increases in food trade volumes, but small changes in grain self-sufficiency ratios to 2010. Even recognition that agricultural land in China has been substantially underreported (Crook 1993; Kc) , implying a greater potential for China's agricultural production in the future, will not change the projections of increases in food trade volumes.
While one of the most challenging constraints for trade with China is that it is in the midst of reforms, this factor is also what makes its potential so large. Trade reform, coupled with China's fundamental characteristics-the size and growth of its population, the high rate of income growth, and the rise of an urban middle class-makes China one of the biggest potential markets for U.S. valueenhanced agricultural trade in the future.
Income Growth, Rising Urban Middle Class, and Joint Ventures
Income growth rates above 10% over recent years have had profound effects on China's household expenditure patterns (Fan, Wailes, and Cramer; Gao, Wailes, and Cramer 1996a, b) . However, income growth in China has not been uniform. China's national average income was approximately $663 per capita in 1996, while the average Shanghai per capita income was $1,118, nearly 7070 higher. Some have estimated that over 100 million people in the provinces have purchasing power parity incomes greater than $10,000, and that by 2005, China's middle class will number approximately 500 million (Ho and Reynolds) . The expansion has been driven by both the joint ventures of international retailing chains as well as by Shanghai's municipal government.
Eleven percent of Shanghai's shoppers buy regularly from the supermarkets.
The survey identified the following food expenditure shares for Shanghai's supermarket customers: meat (38Yo), vegetables (29%), fruit (14%), breakfast foods (10%), and snacks (9%). Survey participants were asked how much more they would pay for imported food.
One-third of the sample indicated they would pay 10?10 more, and another one-third were willing to pay 5070 more. However, only 36% of the sample had recently purchased imported food products. Table 10 gives the relative importance of attributes, as ranked by survey respondents, found to influence food purchases.
It is believed that rapidly rising consumer incomes and the increase in the number of hotels and joint-venture firms in China's more developed cities (such as Shanghai, Beijing, and Guangzhou) are the other main sources of higher import demand for meat and value-added food.
Perhaps the stiffest competition facing high-value U.S. exports to China will come from domestic production. In part, this is due to the joint venture by foreign food processors including U.S. firms. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in China has been very impressive in recent years and has played a major role in China's push toward a market-oriented economy. From 1979-95, China received $128.1 billion in FDI. Recently, China has been the largest developing-country recipient of FDI, and the inflows to China account for 40% of such flows to all developing countries combined (Broadman and Sun) .
FDI in agriculture also has enjoyed rapid growth in recent years, especially since 1992. Contracted funds to the agriculture sector over the five years from 1992-96 amount to $5.84 billion, 4.2 times the amount pledged during the previous 13 years . Consistent with the overall geographic distribution of FDI in China, the agriculture sector FDI is concentrated along the coastal areas. Guangdong, Fujian, and Shandong accounted for more than 70% of pledged investments. The FDI in agriculture mainly went to the food processing sector (Wang 1997a) , and most of it for small, short-or medium-term projects, generally less than $1 million investments.
Trade Reform and Accession to WTO
Chinese economic reform has reached a point where trade liberalization is a top priority. The magnitude of the economic reform achievements, impacting all sectors of the economy, implies that liberalization of China's trade relations with the rest of the world will have a profound impact not only on China, but also on the international economic and political system. The accession of China to the WTO will no doubt provide the potential for lower tariffs and increased market access for all agricultural products.
China withdrew from the GATT in 1950, and has reapplied (in 1986) to join the organization and its successor, the WTO (Theiler and Tuan) . In order to accelerate its marketoriented reform and enter the WTO, China has already adopted a series of liberalization measures, reduced its tariffs, and increased its market access (as discussed above).
Analysis of China's accession has been conducted with the presumption that Taiwan would enter simultaneously. The impacts of China and Taiwan's integration into WTO on world trade have been studied by several researchers (Wang 1997b; Anderson et al.) . Wang evaluated the potential impact of WTO accession by China and Taiwan on world trade, with particular emphasis on its impact on U.S. agriculture, by using a multi-region, multi-sector computable general equilibrium (CGE) model for world trade and production. His study focused on differences arising from the Uruguay Round trade liberalization on agricultural and manufactured goods with and without China and Taiwan. The main findings from Wang's study include: (a) China's laborintensive sectors (such as textiles and apparels) would expand, its agricultural exports would contract, and net agricultural imports could rise by $8 billion per year; (b) for world grain markets, China and Taiwan would increase their net grain imports by $574 million and $95 million, respectively (about 1.8% of base-year world grain exports); (c) U.S. imports of textiles and apparels would increase by about $12 billion, while exports of technology and capital-intensive manufactured goods would increase by $2.4 billion; (d) U.S. food and agricultural production would expand by 0.4Y0, with output increases in all sectors except rice; (e) the largest gain in U.S. exports would come from the processed food sectors ($1. 15 billion), followed by exports of nongrain crops ($662 million), feed grains ($274 million), and livestock products ($102 million); and (~) higher prices for U.S. food and agricultural exports and more efficient use of production resources would translate into higher value-added farm products, thus raising U.S. farm income.
In another recent study using a CGE framework, Anderson et al. projected results very similar to those of Wang. In their model results, China's exports of textiles and apparels would expand dramatically, and imports of agricultural and food products (especially processed foods and meats) would grow substantially.
Negotiations between China and the WTO members regarding China's accession are still ongoing. The WTO represents an important tool for the rest of the world to reinforce to the Chinese government the desired steps needed to liberalize its economy and support further economic reform. The United States has intensified discussions over China's accession to the WTO with respect to agriculture. Key agricultural issues being discussed include: (a) transparency for state trading enterprises so that market forces, rather than government decisions, play a role in determining import levels; (b) reducing tariffs; (c) removing unjustified sanitary and phytosanitary measures; (d) commitments on domestic and export subsidies; and (e) subscribing to the rest of the WTO trade rules, such as removal of licensing requirements, instituting proper customs valuation, and generally increasing the transparency and predictability of the Chinese import system. The future growth in import demand by China will depend largely on the terms of China's accession to the WTO and prospects for institutionalizing market access commitment and lower tariffs.
Conclusions
Since the economic reforms and "open-door" policies in the late 1970s, China has been one of the fastest growing economies in the world, and China's agricultural trade has experienced rapid expansion. This paper provides an overview of China's trade, and discusses the constraints and potential for U.S. food and agricultural trade with China.
China's total and agricultural trade has experienced rapid growth, especially in the last few years. However, the growth rates for agricultural trade have been much slower than those for total trade. China's agricultural trade structure has changed from raw agricultural products to valued-added processed and manufactured products. China's agricultural imports are either bulk or processed intermediates, while exports are more diversified but are dominated by consumer-ready products and processed intermediates. This structure is consistent with the factor endowment trade theory. China's share of U.S. farm exports, in general, is small, but the upward trend is strong. The southern region of the U.S. has become an important supplier of U.S. food and agricultural exports to China, especially poultry, soybeans, wheat, and cotton. U.S. agricultural exports have been dominated by bulk grains, oilseeds, and cotton. The volume of value-added products from the U.S. to China has been relatively modest, but is growing. The potential for substantially more growth will depend upon further trade policy reforms as expected with accession of China to the WTO. The state trading apparatus, tariffs, licenses, quotas, and other nontariff barriers provide important protection for the development of China's own value-added food and agricultural production and exports. These policies and the food security "grain-bag" policy represent major constraints for expanding agricultural trade. The resource endowment and policy incentives to develop laborintensive value-added manufacturing and processing are key constraints for substantial growth in U.S. value-added agricultural exports to China.
The rise of a middle class, supported by rising real incomes, investment, and employment growth in China's coastal provinces, will provide the greatest potential market for U.S. exports of high-value and high-quality food and agricultural exports. A strengthening of the commitment by China's policy makers to an open market through accession to WTO, without threatening China's sense of food security, will be critical to achieve the potential of China as a major market for U.S. food and agricultural trade.
